This research argues that the di¤erential e¤ect of international trade on the demand for human capital across countries has been a major determinant of the distribution of income and population across the globe. In developed countries the gains from trade have been directed towards investment in education and growth in income per capita, whereas a signi…cant portion of these gains in less developed economies have been channeled towards population growth. Cross-country regressions establish that indeed trade has positive e¤ects on fertility and negative e¤ects on education in non-OECD economies, while inducing fertility decline and human capital formation in OECD economies.
Introduction
The dramatic transformation in the distribution of income and population across the globe in the past two centuries is one of the most signi…cant mysteries in the growth process. Some regions have excelled in the growth of income per capita while other regions have been dominant in population growth. 1 This striking contrast between the development paths of large subsets of the world economy gives rise to fundamental questions about the growth process and its implications for current and historical development patterns.
Notably, how does one account for the sudden take-o¤ from stagnation to growth in some countries in the world and the persistent stagnation in others? Why have the di¤erences in per capita incomes across countries increased so markedly in the last two centuries? Has the pace of transition to sustained economic growth in advanced economies adversely a¤ected the process of development in less-developed economies? Have the forces of international trade contributed to the divergence in the timing of the demographic transition and the emergence of sustained economic growth across countries?
The origin of this 'Great Divergence'in income per capita has been a source of controversy. The relative roles of geographical and institutional factors, human capital formation, ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization, colonialism and globalization have been at the center of a debate about this remarkable change in the world income distribution in the past two centuries. 2 This research suggests that international trade has played a signi…cant role in the di¤erential timing of demographic transitions across countries and has been a major determinant of the distribution of world population and the 'Great Divergence'in income per capita across countries in the last two centuries. The analysis suggests that international trade has an asymmetrical e¤ect on the evolution of industrial and nonindustrial economies. While in the industrial nations the gains from trade have been directed primarily towards investment in education and growth in output per capita, a greater portion of the gains from trade in non-industrial nations has been channeled towards population growth.
The expansion of international trade enhanced the specialization of industrial economies in the production of industrial, skilled intensive, goods. The associated rise in the demand for skilled labor has induced a gradual investment in the quality of the population, expediting a demographic transition, stimulating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative advantage of these industrial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. In non-industrial economies, in contrast, international trade has generated an incentive to specialize in the production of unskilled intensive, non-industrial, goods. The absence of signi…cant demand for human capital has provided limited incentives to invest in the quality of 1 In the time period 1820-1998, the ratio between income per capita in the richest region of the world and the poorest region of the world has increased from about 3 to 19. In particular, the ratio between income per capita in Western Europe and Asia grew nearly three-fold, whereas the ratio between the Asian population and the Western European population grew nearly two-fold (Maddison, 2001 ).
2 North (1981) , Landes (1998) , Mokyr (2002) , Hall and Jones (1999) , Acemoglu, et al. (2005) , Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik, et al. (2004) and Ashraf and Galor (2007) have argued that institutions that facilitated the protection of property rights and enhanced technological research, the di¤usion of knowledge, and the transmission of society speci…c human capital, have been the prime factors that enabled the earlier European take-o¤ and the great technological divergence across the globe. The e¤ect of geographical factors on economic growth and the great divergence have been emphasized by Jones (1981) , Diamond (1997) , Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1998) and Pomeranz (2000) . Finally, the role of human capital in the great divergence is underlined in uni…ed growth theory (Galor, the population and the gains from trade have been utilized primarily for a further increase in the size of the population, rather than the income of the existing population. 3 The demographic transition in these nonindustrial economies has been signi…cantly delayed, increasing further their relative abundance of unskilled labor, enhancing their comparative disadvantage in the production of skilled intensive goods and delaying their process of development. The research suggests, therefore, that international trade has persistently affected the distribution of population, skills, and technologies in the world economy, and has been a signi…cant force behind the 'Great Divergence'in income per capita across countries.
This paper develops a uni…ed growth theory that captures the asymmetric role that international trade may have played in expediting the transition to sustained economic growth in technologically advanced economies and in delaying the transition in technologically inferior economies. The proposed theory is innovative in two dimensions. First, unlike the recent literature on the transition of economies from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth that abstracted from the Great Divergence and focused on the evolution of the world economy from stagnation to growth, 4 the proposed theory examines the di¤erential patterns of takeo¤s across regions in the world and the emergence of the Great Divergence. Second, in contrast to the existing literature on the dynamics of comparative advantage, 5 the focus on the interaction between population growth and comparative advantage and the persistent e¤ect that this interaction may have on the distribution of population and income in the world economy generates an important new insight regarding the distribution of the gains from trade. The theory suggests that even if trade equalizes output growth in the trading countries, (due to the terms of trade e¤ect), income per capita of developed and less developed economies will diverge, since in developed economies the growth of total output will be generated primarily by an increase in output per capita, whereas in less developed economies the contribution of population growth to the growth of total output will be more signi…cant. 6 The theory is based on several fundamental elements. The interaction between these elements generates a dynamic pattern that is consistent with the observed asymmetrical evolution of the world economy from the epoch of Malthusian stagnation to the current era of sustained growth, characterized by widened di¤erences in income per capita and population growth rates, as well as by persistent patterns of comparative advantage. Economies are initially in a Malthusian epoch in which the growth rate of output per capita is rather small and population growth is positively related to the level of income per capita. Technological progress leads ultimately to the adoption of more advanced agricultural and industrial technologies which paves the way for the take-o¤ from the Malthusian epoch. International trade induces technologically advanced economies to specialize in the production of skilled intensive manufactured goods whereas technologically inferior economies specialize in the production of unskilled intensive agricultural goods. The increase in the demand for human capital in the technologically advanced economies that is brought about by international trade induces investment in human capital 7 and expedites the demographic transition, 8 whereas the reduction in the demand for human capital in less advanced economies delays the demographic transition and investment in human capital. 9 The analysis demonstrates that the acceleration of the demographic transition in the technologically advanced economies increases their formation of human capital and brings about sustained technological progress that enhances their comparative advantage in the production of skilled intensive industrial goods. 10 In contrast, the delay in the demographic transition in the less advanced economies increases the supply of unskilled workers and enhances the comparative advantage of these economies in the production of unskilled intensive goods. Thus, consistent with the evidence provided in sections 5 and 6, the pattern of international trade has reinforced the initial patterns of comparative advantage and has generated a persistent e¤ect on the distribution of population in the world economy and a great divergence in income per capita across countries and regions.
The fundamental hypothesis is tested empirically using contemporary cross country data. In accordance with the theory, cross country regressions support the hypothesis that international trade generates opposing e¤ects on fertility rates and education in developed and less developed economies. The analysis establishes that a larger share of trade in GDP per capita has a positive e¤ect on fertility and a negative e¤ect on human capital formation in non-OECD economies, whereas in OECD economies, trade triggers a decline in fertility and an increase in human capital accumulation.
An Autarkic Economy
This section analyzes the path of a closed economy from its Malthusian pre-industrial state through a transitional state of increased fertility, investment in human capital and economic growth to a modern state with high investment in human capital, low population growth, and sustained economic growth.
11 7 Consistent with empirical evidence, the increased demand for human capital has not resulted necessarily in an increase in the equilibrium rate of return to human capital due to a massive supply response generated by (a) the increase in the incentive for investment in education (for a given cost), and (b) institutional changes (e.g., the provision of public education) that lowered the cost of investment in human capital. 8 Unlike Becker (1981)'s hypothesis where a high level of income induces parents to switch to having fewer, higher quality children, the substitution of quality for quantity is in response to technological progress. The fact that demographic transitions occurred around the same period in Western European countries that di¤ered in their income per capita, but shared a similar pattern of future technological progress, supports our technological approach. 9 Moreover, the increased specialization of production within an economy would result, ceteris paribus, in increased income and fertility inequality within the economy, in line with the …nding of Haines (2000) that fertility rate in rural areas remained higher than for urban areas for signi…cant periods in the nineteenth century in both the US and UK, as well as with the …ndings of de la Croix and Doepke (2003) that income inequality causes di¤erential fertility patterns within and across economies.
1 0 Similarly to this element in the theory, Grossman and Helpman (1991) demonstrates that a country that begins with a head start in the accumulation of knowledge often leads in productivity over time.
1 1 Galor and Mountford (2006) abstracts from these stages of development and demonstrates in a simpler Ricardian model that although international trade may equalize the growth rates of the value of total output in the two trading economies, since the rate of population growth in the technologically regressed economy is higher than that in the advanced economy, the rate of growth of output per capita in the technologically advanced economy will be higher than that in the technologically regressed Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which economic activity extends over in…nite discrete time. In every period t; two goods, a manufactured good, Y m t ; and an agricultural good Y a t , may be produced using up to three factors of production, skilled labor, H t , unskilled labor, L t ; and land, X. The supply of skilled and unskilled labor is endogenously determined and evolves over time, whereas the quantity of land is exogenously determined and remains constant over time. 12 
Production
In each of the sectors of the economy production may take place with either an old technology or a new one. In early stages of development the new production technologies are latent and production is conducted using the old technologies. However, in the process of development the productivity of the new technologies grows faster than those of the old technologies and ultimately the new technologies become economically viable. In the agricultural sector, the introduction of the new technology represents the escape from the Malthusian trap, where wages do not fall despite an increase in population. In the industrial sector, the introduction of the new technology re ‡ects an increase in the skill-intensity of the production process in the second phase of the industrial revolution and the associated increase in the demand for human capital.
Production of the Agricultural Good
The agricultural good can be produced by either an old technology or a new one. The output of the agricultural good produced with the old technology in period t, Y
where L a;0 t is the amount of unskilled labor and X is the amount of land, employed in period t in the production of the agricultural good using the old technology, and a a t is the level of productivity of the old technology in period t. For simplicity the amount of land is normalized such that X = 1.
The output of the agricultural good produced with the new technology in period t, Y a;N t
; is governed by a constant returns to scale production technology
where L a;N t is the amount of unskilled labor employed in the production of the agricultural good in period t using the new technology, and A a t is the level of productivity of the new agricultural technology in period t. As will become apparent, in the early stages of development when the productivity of the new agricultural technology, A a t ; is low relative to the productivity of the old technology, a a t ; only the old technology will be employed. However in later stages of development, when A a t rises su¢ ciently relative to a a t ; the new agricultural technology becomes economically viable.
Production of the Manufactured Good
The manufactured good can be produced by either an old technology or a new one. The output of the manufactured good produced with the old technology in period t, Y
economy. 1 2 Since the fundamental mechanism explored in this paper focuses on the role of human capital accumulation and the demographic transition in the process of development, the abstraction from the role of physical capital is a natural simplifying assumption.
1 3 This production function is designed to capture the decline in the importance of land in mature state of development. However, as established in Appendix B, the qualitative analysis would remain intact if the agricultural technology remains land-intensive.
where L m;0 t is the amount of unskilled labor employed in period t in the production of the manufactured good using the old technology, and a m t is the level of productivity of the old industrial technology in period t.
The output of the manufactured good produced with the modern technology in period t, Y m;N t
; is governed by a neoclassical constant returns to scale production function, 
Factor Prices and Goods'Prices
Producers operate in perfectly competitive markets for …nal goods and for labor. In the absence of property rights to land, the return to land is zero and workers in the agricultural sector who use the old technology receive their average products. 14 The inverse demand for unskilled labor in the agricultural sector, given (1) and (2) , is therefore
where w u t is the wage of an unskilled labor in terms of the manufactured good, and p t as the relative price of the agricultural good in terms of the manufactured good in period t.
The inverse demand for skilled and unskilled labor in the manufactured sector, given (3) and (4), is therefore
and w
Moreover,
where as follows from the neoclassical properties of f (h
Since unskilled workers are mobile between the agricultural and the industrial sectors, the wages of unskilled labor in both sectors are equal if both goods are produced. As follows from (5) and (6), p t ; the relative price of the agricultural good in terms of the manufactured good in period t, is therefore 2.2 Individuals: Fertility, Human Capital and Consumption Individuals live for two periods. In their …rst period of life they consume a fraction of their parental unit time endowment; educated o¤spring require a larger fraction of parental time. In their second period of life they are endowed with one unit of time of either skilled, s; or unskilled labor, u; which they optimally allocate between child rearing and labor force participation.
Preferences and Budget Constraints
Individual's preferences are de…ned over consumption and the potential aggregate income of their children. 15 The preferences of a member i; i = s; u; of generation t (i.e. an individual who is born in period t 1) are represented by the utility function is the number of o¤spring trained to be unskilled workers, and w s t+1 and w u t+1 are the wages paid to skilled and unskilled o¤spring in period t + 1:
16 Individuals face subsistence consumption constraint and they must consume a subsistence level of the agricultural good, e c: Individuals allocate their time between labor force participation and child rearing. They further choose both the number and quality of children and the amount of each good to consume. Denoting the time required to bring up a skilled o¤spring as, s , and the time required to bring up an unskilled o¤spring as, u , where s > u , the budget constraint of a member i of generation t; i = s; u; is
1 5 The number of children could be interpreted as the expected number of surviving children in a environment where due to infant mortality rate only a fraction of the children born will survive. As long as the cost of raising non-surviving children is insigni…cant the results will not be a¤ected qualitatively. The results are identical if the cost of raising non-surviving children is zero and there is no uncertainty about the fraction of surviving children. Hence in an environment with higher infant mortality fertility rate will be mechanically higher. would generate identical qualitative results. The second component of the utility function may represent either intergenerational altruism, or implicit concern about potential support from children in old age. The interpretation that emphasizes intergenerational altruism re ‡ects an implicit bounded rationality on the part of the parent. Alternative formulations according to which individuals generate utility from the utility of their children, or from the actual aggregate income of their o¤spring would require parental predictions about fertility choices of their dynasty. These approaches would greatly complicate the model but they would not a¤ect the qualitative results.
Optimization
A member i of generation t chooses fc The optimization depends on whether the subsistence consumption constraint is binding. If income is high enough, the constraint will not bind and the log-linearity of the utility function implies that …xed shares of potential income are devoted to child rearing and consuming each of the two goods. However if the subsistence consumption constraint binds then a greater share of potential income must be devoted to agricultural consumption.
The consumption of the agricultural good, c i;a t ; by a member i of generation t is therefore 
The consumption of the manufactured good, c 
Furthermore, the number of educated and uneducated o¤spring will be determined such that the aggregate time devoted by a member i of generation t to child rearing is 
Education and Fertility Decisions
This section demonstrates that in the early stages of development, when the technological level is relatively low, individuals do not have an incentive to invest in the human capital of their o¤spring. However, as the level of technology improves in the process of development, the new industrial technology will ultimately become economically viable, human capital will be demanded and individuals will have an incentive to invest in the human capital of their o¤spring.
Lemma 1 Consider the new industrial sector. There exists a unique ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, (h m ) ;
where,
Proof. 
and therefore w
Aggregate Labor Allocation
Since preferences are such that both goods are consumed in every period, in autarky both goods must be produced in every period. Hence an equilibrium in the goods market requires that, in a given technological state, the demand for the agricultural and the industrial goods given by (11) and (12) 
Technological Progress
Suppose that technological progress, g t+1 ; that takes place between periods t and t + 1 is a¤ected positively by the skill intensity of the workforce in period t, h t .
where g(h t ) is an increasing concave function (g 0 (h t ) > 0 and g 00 (h t ) < 0): Furthermore, the rate of technological progress is positive even if the labor force consists of only unskilled labor (i.e., g(0) > 0).
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Suppose that the productivity levels in each sector are functions of the level of a General Purpose Technology in the economy as a whole. Namely, the productivity of the old and the new technologies in the agricultural sector, a; and the industrial sector, m; are
where, dA j =d > 0 and da j =d > 0; j = a; m:
there is indeterminacy in the choice of how many skilled and unskilled o¤spring to produce. This indeterminacy can be resolved by assuming that ceteris paribus parents prefer educated children. The indeterminacy resolves itself after one period in any case as technology progresses. 1 8 The qualitative analysis would not be altered if the growth rate of technology would a¤ect the return to human capital. As is established in Appendix B, if the agricultural technology remains land-intensive then it is the rate of growth of technology that is vital. Although the threshold and the rate of growth models are theoretically distinct mechanisms, they are both consistent with the same set of facts i.e. a growing rate of technological change occurring alongside an increase in the rate of human capital accumulation and a non-monotonic relationship between population growth and income.
The productivity parameters are restricted so as to assure that the process of technological progress is consistent with its historical patterns: (a) The new industrial and agricultural technologies are not economically viable in period 0; i.e.,
where N 0 > 0 is the initial size of the adult population.
(b) The advancement in the productivity of the industrial sector is larger than that in the agricultural sector, 19 and the new technologies advance more rapidly than the old ones, i.e.,
Condition A2 ensures that a more technologically advanced economy has a comparative advantage in the industrial good.
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Lemma 4 Under A1, A2 (a) there exists a time period (t m ) in which the new industrial technology becomes economically viable,
(b) there exists a time period (t a ) in which the new agricultural technology becomes economically
where (L a;0 t ) is the level of employment in the old agricultural sector necessary for the old agricultural sector alone to satisfy the total demand for agricultural products at time t.
Proof. See Appendix.
In order to simplify the determination of factor prices, the new agricultural technology is assumed to become economically viable before the new industrial technology, i.e.,
This assumption assures that the static structure of the model resembles the Ricardo-Viner trade model. In any period wages of skilled and unskilled workers are determined by either the constant marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the old industrial sector (prior to the employment of the modern agricultural 1 9 These assumptions are consistent with historical evidence that suggests that productivity in the agricultural sector grew less rapidly than in the industrial sector over the late part of the 18th century and the entire 19th century. In particular, sectoral productivity growth in the UK in the period 1780-1860 was estimated by McCloskey (1981) to be 1.8% in the modernized sector and 0.45% in the agricultural sector. The gap was revised downward by Harley (1999) who estimate productivity growth in the modernized sector to be 1.2% and 0.7% in the agricultural sector.
2 0 Despite the fact that modern production technology is not employed over a certain period of time, the advancement in knowledge permits the advancement in the productivity of this potential technology to be faster than the older one. For instance, early vintages of the steam engines were very ine¢ cient and thus were not used. However, advancement in knowledge permitted this technology to advance rather rapidly and to become e¤ective. Namely, the advancement in the latent technology is via learning by doing in the laboratory rather than in the industry.
2 1 As follows from (9), condition A2 also has the implication that the relative price of the agricultural good is monotonically increasing over time. Evidence suggests that the relative price of agricultural goods rose over the period 1880-1920 and declined over the period 1920 -1990 (Caselli and Coleman, 1999 . This pattern can be easily matched if the cost of acquiring skills would vary over time. In particular, if the cost of acquiring skills is increasing over time, (i.e. s = u is increasing with :), the relative price of agricultural goods could decrease over time. technology), or the constant marginal productivity of unskilled workers in the agricultural sector (once the modern agricultural technology is used). As established in the Appendix, the qualitative result would not be a¤ected if this structure is not imposed.
Human Capital Accumulation
The evolution of human capital accumulation is characterized by three regimes. In the time period t < (t m ) ;
as long as the new industrial technology is not economically viable, there is no demand for skilled individuals and thus parents will not raise skilled children and the proportion of skilled labor in the labor force will be zero. In the time interval (t m ) t t , once the new industrial technology is economically viable, but the subsistence consumption constraint is still binding for at least unskilled parents, skilled children will be raised, and while the proportion of skilled labor in the industrial sector will be constant at a level, (h m ) ; the proportion of skilled labor in the entire labor force, h t+1 ; will depend upon the demand for human capital as re ‡ected by the level of technology, t+1 : Technological progress and its e¤ect of household income will gradually relax the bindingness of the subsistence agricultural consumption constraint, and will increase the budget share that is devoted to the consumption of the industrial goods. It will therefore generate an increase in the fraction of the labor force employed in the production of industrial goods, increasing the proportion of skilled labor in the entire labor force. Finally, in the time interval t t ; once the subsistence consumption constraint is no longer binding, technological advancements would not a¤ect the budget share devoted to any of the goods, and the proportion of skilled individuals in the entire labor force will be a constant at a levelh:
Lemma 5 The proportion of skilled labor in the entire labor force at time t + 1, h t+1 ; is
where
Proof. See Appendix. Hence, as follows from Lemma 4, Lemma 5, and (15), the evolution of the proportion of skilled labor in the entire labor force is
wheret is the time period in which the subsistence consumption constraint is no longer binding even for unskilled parents
Population Dynamics
The evolution of population is characterized by four regimes. In the time period t < (t a ) ; the economy is in
Malthusian regime where population growth is determined by the rate of technological progress. Technological progress temporarily raises real wages, but in the absence of further technological advancements, these gains are gradually eroded by population growth. Due to diminishing returns to labor in the agricultural sector, population growth reduces real wages and future fertility until population growth falls to zero. In the time period (t a ) < t < (t m ) ; the emergence of the new agricultural technology permits an advancement of population without a reduction in real wages. Thus income per capita increases along with population growth. In the time period (t m ) < t <t; the new technology in the industrial sector becomes viable but the subsistence consumption constraint is still binding for at least unskilled parents. The rise in the demand for human capital provides an incentive for parents to raise skilled children. Hence, a decline in the rate of population growth eventually accompanies the rise in income per capita. Finally, in the time interval t t ; once the subsistence consumption constraint is no longer binding, technological advancements do not a¤ect the budget share devoted to industrial production. The proportion of skilled individuals in the entire labor force with constant at a levelh; and the rate of population growth is constant as well.
Lemma 6
The evolution of population is characterized by four regimes .
where @ j =@N t > 0 for all j = 1; 2; 3, @ j =@ t > 0 for j = 1; 2; and e n (1
Proof. Follows from (13), (14), Lemma 5,and Lemma A1, noting that s > u .
Industrialization and Demographic Transition
In advanced stages of development (i.e., t > (t m ) > (t a ) ); the new industrial technology is economically viable and there is a demand for skilled labor. This stage of development is characterized by self-reinforcing interaction between technological progress and the human capital intensity in the labor force. As established in Lemma 5, the level of technology has a positive e¤ect on the proportion of skilled labor in the entire labor force, while the skill-intensity of the labor force governs the pace of technological advancement. As established in the lemma below, technological progress generates two con ‡icting forces on the rate of population growth. On the one hand, it raises the wage level and thus household's income, increasing the budget share devoted to manufactured goods, and therefore the demand for skilled workers. Hence, since s > u ; technological progress provides an inducement for lower fertility rates.. However, on the other hand, the rise in household's income allows more resources to be devoted to raising children, exerting a positive in ‡uence on the level of fertility.
Lemma 7 If the new technologies are economically viable in both sectors, and if the subsistence constraint is binding for skilled and unskilled workers; then the total number of o¤ spring n i t ; of an individual i; i = s; u; is
Proof. Follows from the de…nition of h t+1 in the proof of Lemma 5, noting (13) .
The theory generates the inverted 'U'shaped pattern that characterizes the evolution of population growth in the course of economic development. 22 As established in (13) , the rise in income in early stages of development in which the subsistence consumption constraint is binding, increases the share of parental time that is devoted to child rearing. However, since investment in education is not rewarded in this stages of development, the entire increase in the share of parental time that is devoted to child rearing is allocated towards an increase in the number of uneducated children. Hence, the rise in income per-capita in the take-o¤ from the Malthusian epoch results in a gradual increase in population growth. The inevitable introduction of the modern industrial technology brings about a demand for educated labor and the increasing parental resources that are allocated to child rearing are devoted partially towards educated children. The gradual increase in the reward to education shifts the allocation of resources toward child quality and population growth ultimately declines.
The Modern Industrial Stage
In the modern industrial stage, the level of technology generates a su¢ ciently high income level for each household such that the subsistence constraint is no longer binding. The economy reaches a state where the population growth rate and the skill intensity of the economy are constant. The budget share devoted to manufactured goods and the level of human capital accumulation is higher than in the previous stage of development and the fertility rate is lower. The growth of income per capita is therefore higher, noting that the rate of technological progress, g t+1 = g(h t ); increases in the skill intensity of the labor force.
Proposition 1 If the new technologies are economically viable in both sectors and neither skilled nor unskilled workers are constrained by the subsistence constraint, the economy is in a state of balanced growth with a constant population growth rate,ñ = [(1 )(1 + ( e h=(1 e h))]=[ u + ( e h=(1 e h)) s ]; and constant skill intensity, e h:
Proof. Follows from (13), Lemma 5, and Lemma 7.
Corollary 2 If the new technologies are economically viable in both sectors and neither skilled nor unskilled workers are constrained by the subsistence constraint, the budget share devoted to manufactured goods and the level of human capital accumulation will be higher than in the previous stages and the fertility rate will be lower than the level in the previous stage.
Proof. Follows from (13), Lemmas A1, 5, and 7,.
International Trade and the Process of Development
This section analyzes the e¤ect of international trade on economies'transition to a state of sustained economic growth. The analysis demonstrates that international trade accelerates the transition of technologically advanced economies to a state of sustained growth, whereas it prolongs the transition of less advanced economies to a state of sustained economic growth, perhaps inde…nitely.
Comparative Advantage
Suppose that the world economy consists of two economies that are identical in every respect except for their level of technology. In particular, economy A is more technologically advanced than economy B and therefore possesses more advanced technologies for the production of the industrial good as well as for the agricultural good, i.e.,
Furthermore, since technological progress in the industrial sector is faster than in the agricultural sector, the industrial technology is relatively more advanced in economy A, and the technologically advanced country has a comparative advantage in the production of the industrial good, i.e.,
Autarkic and Trade Equilibrium
Suppose that international trade does not take place prior to the stage in which the new production technologies become economically viable. As established above, since technological advancement is biased towards the industrial sector, the autarkic relative price of the agricultural good, p A ; in the technologically advanced economy, A, is higher than the autarkic relative price, p B ; in the less technologically advanced economy, B:
That is, as follows from (9) 
where as follows from (19),
As international trade is established between the two countries, the international equilibrium relative price of the agricultural good, p t ; is determined in between the autarkic equilibrium prices, p 
Patterns of Specialization
International trade therefore causes each of the countries to specialize relative to their position in autarky. Furthermore, it follows from (19) and (20) that one of the economies completely specializes in production.
(If p B t < p t < p A t ; the two economies completely specialize in production). 23 From the viewpoint of the technologically advanced economy, A, there is reduction in the relative price of the agricultural good, and producers are induced to produce more of the industrial good. From the viewpoint of the less advanced economy, B; there is an increase in the relative price of the agricultural good and producers are induced to produce more of the agricultural good. International trade, therefore induces economy A to specialize in the production of the industrial, skilled intensive, good, whereas economy B is induced to specialize in the production of the agricultural good.
Trade and Population Growth
The e¤ect of international trade on the patterns of specialization in production in period t, a¤ects the demand for skilled and unskilled labor in the two economies in period t; and generates an advanced supply response from parents who are taking decisions about the optimal number of skilled and unskilled children to raise in period t 1 in light of the expected rate of return for skilled and unskilled workers in period t:
Proposition 2 If the world economy is opened to international trade: (a) The rate of population growth of the technologically advanced economy, A; is a¤ ected negatively (b) The rate of population growth of the technologically less advanced economy, B is a¤ ected positively. Population growth in the two economies prior to the demographic transition is a¤ected positively by the aggregate resources of the economy and negatively by the rate of return to human capital. The e¤ect of international trade expedites the demographic transition in the technological advanced economy, A, whereas it slows it down in the technologically less advanced economy, B.
Proposition 3
If the world economy is opened to International trade (a) The demographic transition of the technologically advanced economy, A, is accelerated (b) The demographic transition of the technologically less advanced economy, B, is delayed" perhaps inde…nitely,
Proof. As established below in Proposition 4, international trade widens the technological gap between the advanced and the less advanced economies. The relative income of economy B in the world economy depends on its rate population growth relative to that of the advanced economy A: If the share of income of economy B in the world economy falls over time then economy B could completely specialize in agricultural production, and the economy would never generate a demand for skilled workers and would therefore not experience a demographic transition. Alternatively if the relative share of income of economy B in the world economy rises over time then ultimately the output of the manufactured good in economy A will be insu¢ cient to meet world demand, and economy B would begin demanding skilled workers and eventually would experience a demographic transition. For economy A international trade increases the rate of technological progress and thereby the demand for skilled labor, accelerating the demographic transition.
Trade and the Technological Gap
This initial e¤ect of international trade on population growth will persist, and the initially less advanced economy will become even relatively less advanced through time.
Proposition 4 International trade widens the technological gap between the advanced and less advanced economies.
Proof. As follows from (15) , the increase in the proportion of skilled workers [h t ]
A in the technologically advanced economy increases the rate of technological progress in the economy, whereas the reduction in the proportion of skilled workers [h t ] B in the technologically less advanced economy, decreases its rate of technological progress. Since g 0 (h t ) > 0 the proposition follows.
Corollary 3 International trade reinforces the initial patterns of comparative advantage.
The E¤ect of Trade in a Multi-Country Setting
The model presented here is highly stylized. However the economic mechanisms derived in the paper would still hold in more detailed models. In a model with more than two economies, for example, the e¤ect of causality from fertility and human capital formation to trade patterns. In the absence of authoritative data on the factor content of trade that would have enabled us to divide the world into economies which export human capital intensive goods and those which export unskilled labor intensive goods, we test our hypothesis on a pre-existing division of the world economy, and consider OECD economies in 1985 as those who export on average human capital intensive goods and non-OECD economies in 1985 as those who export unskilled intensive goods. 25 The sample consists of 132 countries for the fertility regressions and 97 countries for the human capital accumulation regressions. 26 The theory suggests that international trade, via its e¤ect on the patterns of specialization, would increase the demand for human capital in the OECD economies and decrease the demand for human capital in non-OECD economics. This would generate a force towards a decline in fertility rates and an increase in human capital investment in OECD economies and towards a rise in fertility rates and a decline in human capital investment in non-OECD economies. The gains from international trade, however, would be expected to generate a rise in income in both OECD and non-OECD countries. In the pre-demographic transition 2 4 See the Appendix for the de…nitions and summary statistics of all variables. 2 5 Tre ‡er and Zhu (2005) provide supporting evidence for this segmentation and the underlying di¢ culties in estimating the factor content of trade. 2 6 OPEC economies are omitted from the sample since their trade patterns do not capture the characteristics underlined by the theory and the wealth e¤ect associated with their oil revenues could potentially distort the relationship between trade, fertility and education. In addition, Reunion is excluded from the sample since it is an integral part of the French Republic and is thus not an independent observation. The incorporation of OPEC economies and Reunion into the analysis, or the inclusion of a dummy variable for OPEC economies does not alter the qualitative results. era these gains in income would be channeled towards an increase in fertility rates. They would therefore enhance the increase in fertility rates in less developed economies and would o¤set some of the negative e¤ect of the rise in the demand for human capital on fertility in developed economies.
However, in the post-demographic transition era, which is the time period that characterizes our data, the rise in income due to international trade generates, at the parental level, con ‡icting income and substitution e¤ects with respect to the optimal number of children and their quality. Although, according to the theory, these e¤ects o¤set one another, the rise in households'income increases the relative demand for human capital intensive goods (as the subsistence agricultural consumption constraint is satis…ed) and generates a force towards a decline in fertility and a rise in human capital investment in non-OECD economies as well as in OECD economies that have not reached their balanced growth path. Thus, in the postdemographic transition era, the overall e¤ect of international trade on fertility in OECD economies would be expected to be negative, whereas the overall e¤ect of trade on fertility in non-OECD economies is a¤ected by two con ‡icting forces. Controlling for income, however, the e¤ect of trade on fertility is predicted to be positive in non-OECD economies and negative in OECD economies. Similarly, controlling for income, the e¤ect of trade on human capital formation is predicted to be negative in non-OECD economies and positive in OECD economies. Furthermore, some of the variation in fertility rates across countries would re ‡ect variation in infant mortality rates. As long as parents generate utility from the number of surviving children, the theory predicts that infant mortality rates have a positive e¤ect on fertility rates in both OECD and non-OECD economies. Table 1 Moreover, these regressions indicate that indeed our sample consists of economies in the post-demographic transition era, where fertility is negatively associated with income per capita. Consistent with the theory, this negative association is of larger magnitude and statistical signi…cance among non-OECD economies that have experienced the onset of the demographic transition more recently. Columns (2) and (6) present the results from OLS regressions of fertility on trade for non-OECD and OECD economies, respectively, controlling for the log of GDP per capita in 1985 and for the average infant mortality rate in the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . The regressions show that in accordance with the theory, the association between fertility and trade is positive and signi…cant at the 5% level in non-OECD and negative and insigni…cant in OECD economies.
The E¤ect of Trade on Fertility
Once the in ‡uence of the potential existence of omitted variables, measurement errors, and reverse causality, is controlled for by instrumenting for the share of trade in GDP in 1985 with the Frankel-Romer instrument, then as predicted by the theory, columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) demonstrate that the e¤ect of trade on fertility is positive and signi…cant in non-OECD economies and negative and signi…cant in OECD economies. Controlling for the log of GDP per capita in 1985, in column (3), and for the infant mortality rates as well, in column (4), trade has a positive e¤ect on fertility in non-OECD economies, and this e¤ect is signi…cant at the 1% level. 27 Moreover, as reported in column (7) and (8), trade has a negative e¤ect on fertility in OECD economies, that is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level if only income is controlled for, and at the 5% level if both income and infant mortality is controlled. 28 Using the results in column (4) of Table 1 for non-OECD economies, the elasticity of fertility with respect to trade share is 0.70/TFR. The average level of TFR for non-OECD countries is 4.84 and thus the elasticity is about 0.15. Thus if a non-OECD economy doubled its trade share, then fertility would rise by 15% or by 0.7 of a child per woman. 29 The same calculation for OECD economies, using the results from column (8) of Table 1 , yields an elasticity of -0.13/1.76 = -0.07. In this case, a doubling of trade would lead to a reduction in fertility of 0.13 of a child per woman.
Interestingly the inclusion of an instrumental variable for trade share reinforces the opposing e¤ects of trade on fertility in OECD and non-OECD economies. For the non-OECD economies, the use of an instrumental variable increases the size and signi…cance of the positive e¤ect of trade on fertility, whereas for OECD economies, the use of an instrumental variable increases the size and signi…cance of the negative e¤ect of trade on fertility. 2 7 Importantly, the results remain nearly identical if we exclude the control for income per capita in column (4) and (8) . Namely, the overall e¤ect of trade (directly and indirectly via income) is 0.65 (0.19) in non-OECD economies and -0.14 (0.06) for OECD economies. Moreover, the exclusion of Eastern European economies slightly increases the coe¢ cient on trade in column (4) of Table 1 to 0.71, which remains signi…cant at the 1% level. The inclusion of OPEC economies slightly reduces the coe¢ cient to 0.69, which remains signi…cant at the 1% level. Moreover, if the sample of non-OECD economies is restricted to the 74 countries sample used in Table 2 for the analysis of the e¤ect of trade on education, the qualitative results remain intact. The coe¢ cient for trade becomes .77 with a p value of 0.004. 2 8 The qualitative results will not be a¤ected if the dependent variable will be based on of the average TFR over the longer time intervals 1985-1995. The point estimate on the e¤ect of trade in non-OECD economies will be nearly identical (0.70) and the e¤ect remains signi…cant at the 1% level, and in OECD economies it will be -0.08, and signi…cant at the 10% level. The e¤ect on the average TFR over even a longer time interval, 1985-2000, is not surprisingly weaker. It is nearly identical for non-OECD economies (0.68 and signi…cant at the 1% level), and still negative, but insigni…cant for OECD economies. The use of the average Crude Birth Rates over the period 1985-1990 as a dependent variable does not a¤ect the qualitative results as well. The e¤ect of trade is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level for non-OECD economies, and negative and signi…cant at nearly 5% level for OECD economies. 2 9 Note that the measure of trade is share of trade in GDP and this ranges from 13.16 (Myanmar) to 318.07 (Singapore). Thus, it is reasonable to consider a doubling of trade share. (3), (4), (7) and (8) The IV regressions use Frankel and Romer (1999)'s instrument for the country's intrinsic propensity to trade. This instrument is generated by aggregating the results from thousands of bilateral trade relationships which are estimated using a regression of bilateral trade share in GDP on seven variables and some of their interactions. These seven variables are the bilateral distance between the two trading economies, a dummy for whether there is a common border between the two trading economies, a dummy for whether one or more economy is landlocked and the country size variables, log area and log population for both countries.
In Frankel and Romer's analysis, income per capita is the dependent variable in the …nal stage. They argue that the …rst three variables do not a¤ect income per capita directly, only via trade, and so they exclude them from their …nal stage regressions. For the country size variables, they argue that these variables do have a direct e¤ect on income per capita, via within country trade, and hence they include a country's log area and log population as exogenous variables in the …nal stage of their model. In our regressions, however, fertility and human capital accumulation are the dependent variables and, consistently with our theory, it appears that they will not be a¤ected directly by the country's area or population size. 30 They will be a¤ected indirectly by these variables, via their e¤ect on income per capita, but income is controlled for in The main hypothesis of the theory regarding the di¤ erential e¤ect of trade on fertility rates in developed and less developed economies is con…rmed by the evidence presented in Table 1 and more formally in Table 3 . The di¤erences in the e¤ect of trade on fertility in OECD and non-OECD economies is illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b which plot the partial e¤ect of trade on fertility from the regressions in columns (4) (signi…cant at the 5% level in a one sided test), whereas in column (8) it will be -0.56 (signi…cant at the 1% level in the one-sided test).
and (8) of Table 1 . 32 Table 2 (2) and (4) demonstrate that the e¤ect of trade on education is negative and signi…cant at the 5% level for non-OECD economies and positive and signi…cant at the 5% level for OECD economies. 33 Interestingly the inclusion of an instrumental variable for trade share reinforces the opposing e¤ects of trade on education in OECD and non-OECD economies. For the non-OECD economies, the use of an instrumental variable increases the size and signi…cance of the negative e¤ect of trade on education, whereas for OECD economies, the use of an instrumental variable increases the size and signi…cance of the positive e¤ect of trade on education. 3 2 It should be noted that given that only 24 countries belong to our sample of OECD economies in 1985, the signi…cance of the negative e¤ect of trade on fertility should be expected to be fragile to the exclusion of some countries from the sample. Nevertheless, if in Regression (7), the outliers of Luxemburg, Iceland, and Ireland are excluded together or in any feasible pairwise or individual permutation, the e¤ect of trade remains negative and statistically signi…cant at least at the 5% level. If in Regression (8) , the outliers of Luxemburg, Iceland, and Ireland are excluded together the e¤ect of trade remains negative and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. If any feasible pairwise permutation of these three countries is excluded, the results remain signi…cant at least at the 10% level (in the one sided test). If only Luxemburg is excluded from regression (8) the e¤ect of trade remain negative but insigni…cant. (If controls for log area and log population are included the signi…cance at the 5% level is restored). However, as established in the combined sample in Tables 3, even if Luxemburg is excluded from the sample, trade has a signi…cantly di¤erent e¤ect on fertility in OECD and non-OECD economies. 3 3 The qualitative results are una¤ected if Eastern European economies are excluded from the sample or OPEC economies are included in it. The exclusion of Eastern European economies slightly reduces the coe¢ cient on trade in column (2) of Table 2 to -0.26, which remains signi…cant at the 5% level. The inclusion of OPEC economies reduces the coe¢ cient to -0.16, (signi…cant at the 1% level). Furthermore, the qualitative results will not be a¤ected if the dependent variable will be the change in average years primary school (of the population above the age 15) over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . The e¤ect of trade on education in non-OECD economies will negative and signi…cant at the 5% level, and in OECD positive and signi…cant at the 1% level in a one-sided test. Moreover, in the IV regression (2) the results will not be a¤ected by the inclusion of the excluded control for log population in 1985. The point estimate of the e¤ect of log trade share in GDP will become much larger in absolute value (-0.49) (signi…cant at the 5% level). If a control for log area will be added, the e¤ect will remain negative but insigni…cant. In addition, the qualitative results of the IV regression (4) will not be a¤ected by the inclusion of the excluded control for log area. The point estimate of the e¤ect of log trade share in GDP will become (1.08) signi…cant at the 10% level in a one sided test). If a control for log population will be added, the e¤ect will remain positive but insigni…cant. As discussed above, there are compelling reasons to exclude these variables from the second stage of the IV regressions The e¤ect of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 on the change in the average years of total education (for population above the age 15) in the periods: 1985-1990 (i) Regressions (2) and (4) The signi…cantly di¤erent e¤ect of trade on education in OECD and non-OECD economies which is established more formally in Table 4 , is illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b which plot the partial e¤ect of trade on human capital accumulation from the regressions in columns (2) and (4) of Table 2. 34 3 4 Given that only 23 countries belong to our sample of OECD economies in 1985, the signi…cance of the negative e¤ect of trade on human capital accumulation should be expected to be fragile to the exclusion of some countries from the sample. Nevertheless, if in Regression (4), Norway, that appears to be an outlier, is excluded, the e¤ect of trade remains positive and statistically signi…cant at the 10% level in the one-sided test. If in addition, Finland is excluded, the e¤ect of trade still remains positive and nearly signi…cant at the 10% level in the one-sided test. Furthermore, as established in the combined sample in Tables 4, even This section con…rms the hypothesis that the di¤erential e¤ect of trade on fertility in OECD and non-OECD economies is statistically signi…cant and robust. Using the entire sample, it shows that the e¤ect of trade on fertility is signi…cantly more negative in OECD economies Moreover, it establishes that this di¤erential e¤ect of trade on fertility is robust to various changes in the regression's speci…cation as detailed below.
The E¤ect of Trade on Education
The two sub-samples used in the separate regressions displayed in Table 1 can be combined into a single regression model of the form 35 This model has the bene…t of using all the information in the data set to test whether the relationship between the variables di¤ers signi…cantly between these two sub-samples. Table 3 (8)). In all these regressions, the e¤ect of trade on fertility is positive, remarkably stable (ranging from 0.64 to 0.71), and signi…cant at the 1% level in non-OECD economies, and is signi…cantly more negative and very stable (ranging from -0.71 to -0.84) in OECD economies (i.e., the coe¢ cient on the interactions between the OECD dummy and trade is negative and signi…cant at the 1% level). 36 In addition the results are nearly identical if the sample is 3 5 The relationships estimated in this model are precisely the same as those from two separate regressions on the two subsamples, with the parameters for the separate regressions of Table 1 given by 0 ; 1 , 2 , and 3 , for the subsample of non-OECD countries, and by 0 + 4 ; 1 + 5 and 2 + 6 , and 3 + 7 for the subsample of OECD countries. See for example Greene (1997) Chapter 8. 3 6 Clearly, the coe¢ cients in regression (8) that uses Crude Birth Rates di¤er from those in regressions (1)- (7) that uses TFR. As discussed above, although there are compelling reasons to exclude the log area and log population from the second stage of the IV regressions, it should be noted that the qualitative results will not be a¤ected by the inclusion of controls for log population in 1985 and log area. For instance, in the baseline regression in column (1), the e¤ect of trade on fertility in non-OECD economies is positive and signi…cant at the 5% level, and it is signi…cantly more negative (at the 5% level) for OECD economies. In Regression (2)- (7), the results remains at least signi…cant at the 10% level. In regression (8) the results remain signi…cant as long as Eastern European countries are excluded or continental dummies are included.
restricted to the 97 countries, used in Table 4 , in the baseline examination of the e¤ect of trade on education. (iv) denotes signi…cance at the 1% level signi…cance at the 5% level signi…cance at the 10% level.
Robustness of the Di¤erential E¤ect of Trade on Education
This section con…rms the hypothesis that the di¤erential e¤ect of trade on education in OECD and non-OECD economies is statistically signi…cant and robust. It shows that the e¤ect of trade on education in the entire sample is signi…cantly more positive in OECD economies Moreover, it establishes that this di¤erential e¤ect of trade on education is robust to various changes in the regression's speci…cation as detailed below.
The two sub-samples used in the separate regressions displayed in Table 2 can be combined into a single regression model of the form
where HC i is the change in the years of education of the population, above 15, in the period 1985-1990. Table 4 con…rms the hypothesis that the di¤ erential e¤ect of trade on education in OECD and non-OECD economies is statistically signi…cant, robust and stable. Column (1) displays the results of the e¤ect of the log of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 on the change in the average years of total education over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] (for a population above the age of 15) for the entire sample. As predicted by the theory, the regression shows that the e¤ect of trade on education is signi…cantly negative in non-OECD economies and signi…cantly more positive in OECD economies (i.e., the coe¢ cient on the interactions between the OECD dummy and trade is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level). Regressions (2)- (8) (8)). In all these regressions, the e¤ect of trade on education is negative and signi…cant in non-OECD economies, and it is signi…cantly more positive in OECD economies (i.e., the coe¢ cient on the interactions between the OECD dummy and trade is positive and signi…cant). 37 Interestingly, the e¤ect of trade on education is stronger over longer time intervals (1985-1995 and 1985-2000) , re ‡ecting the fact that the formation of human capital is time-intensive. In contrast, the e¤ect of trade on fertility is slightly lower over longer time intervals, re ‡ecting the faster realization of the response of fertility for economic incentives. The e¤ect of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 on the changes in the average years of total education (for population above the age 15) in the periods: [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] ( (1)- (5)), 1985-1995 ( (6)), and 1985-2000 ( (7)), and on the changes in average years of primary education, [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] ( (8) (iv) denotes signi…cance at the 1% level signi…cance at the 5% level signi…cance at the 10% level.
Historical Evidence
Historical evidence indicates that the fundamental hypothesis of this research is consistent with the process of development of the last two centuries and in particular with the diverging experience in terms of the levels of income per capita and population growth rates of the UK and India since the nineteenth century. The historical evidence described in this section suggests that indeed the asymmetric e¤ect of international trade on the timing of the demographic transition in developed and less-developed economies, and its persistent e¤ect, therefore, on the initial patterns of comparative advantage may be an important element behind the Great Divergence over the last two centuries.
The historical analysis highlights in particular the contrasting process of development of the UK and India over the last two centuries. The evidence demonstrates that during the nineteenth century the UK traded manufactured goods for primary products with India. 38 Consistent with the proposed hypothesis, industrialization in India regressed over this century whereas industrialization in the UK accelerated. The process of industrialization in the UK led to a signi…cant increase in the demand for skilled labor in the second phase of the industrial revolution, triggering a demographic transition and a transition to a state of sustained economic growth. In India, in contrast, the lack of demand for skilled labor delayed the demographic transition and the process of development. Thus, while the gains from trade were utilized in the UK primarily towards an increase in output per capita, in India they were more biased towards an increase in the size of the population. and 51% in the period 1909-13 (Kuznets, 1967) . Other European economies experienced a similar pattern as well. The proportion of foreign trade to national income on the eve of World War I was 54% in France, 38% in Germany , 34% in Italy, and 40% in Sweden (Kuznets, 1967) . Furthermore, exports were critical for the viability of some industries, especially the cotton industry, where 70% of the UK output was exported in the 1870's (Mokyr, 1989) . Thus while technological advances could have spawned the industrial revolution without an expansion of international trade, the growth in exports increased the pace of industrialization and the growth rate of output per capita. Moreover, Pomeranz (2000) , provides historical evidence for the 3 8 The theory is compatible with the case in which the patterns of specialization are not determined by market forces but rather by the interaction between colonial forces and international trade. Colonialism reinforced the adverse e¤ect of international trade on the process of industrialization of less developed economies, depressing the demand for human capital and enhancing the incentive to convert the gains from trade into population growth rather than into an increase in output per capita. 3 9 Consistent with the viewpoint that trade has not been uniformly bene…cial across time and regions, recent research has indicated that the relationship between openness and growth changed in the last century. For example Clemens and Williamson (2004) and Vamvakadis (2002) …nd a negative relationship between openness and growth for the period 1870-1913 and a negative relationship for the period 1970-1998. vital role of trade in the 'take o¤'of the European economies. He argues that technological and development di¤erences between Europe and Asia were minor around 1750, but the discovery of the New World enabled Europe, via Atlantic trade, to overcome 'land constraints'and to take-o¤ technologically. 40 Non-industrialized economies were an important market for the export of the industrial economies, as exhibited in Table 5 . Trade with Asia was especially signi…cant for Britain. According to Bairoch (1974) trade with Asia constituted over 20% of UK total exports throughout the nineteenth century. In contrast, trade with Asia was only 5% or less of French, German or Italian exports. UK imports from Asia were also much more important for the UK than for Europe. Bairoch estimates that 23% of UK imports were originated in Asian countries in 1860 as compared with 12% for continental Europe. For India, however, international trade played the reverse role. As Chaudhuri (1983) describes, 1813-1850 was a period of a rapid expansion in the volume of exports and imports which gradually transformed
India from being an exporter of manufactured products -largely textiles -into a supplier of primary commodities. Trade with the UK was fundamental in this process, as Table 6 demonstrates, with the UK supplying over two thirds of its imports for most of the nineteenth century and being the market for over a third of its exports. Bairoch's (1974 Bairoch's ( , 1982 analysis of international levels of industrialization and international trade supports the viewpoint that international trade was associated with a decrease in the per capita level of industrialization in India. As Table 7 suggests, the rapid industrialization in the UK in the nineteenth century was associated with a decline in the per capita level of industrialization in India. Furthermore, Bairoch (1974) found that industries that employed new technologies made up between 60 and 70 percent of the UK manufacturing industry in 1860 but less than 1 percent of manufacturing industries in the developing countries. Source: Bairoch (1982) The index is normalized to 100 for the UK in 1900 India is measured using its boundaries in 1913
Industrialization and Human Capital Accumulation
The process of industrialization in the UK was characterized by a gradual increase in the relative importance of human capital accumulation. In the …rst phase of the Industrial Revolution (1760-1830), capital accumulation as a fraction of GNP increased signi…cantly whereas literacy rates remained largely unchanged.
Skills and literacy requirements had been minimal and the state devoted virtually no resources to raise the level of literacy of the masses, and economic growth was not impeded by educational retardation. Workers developed skills primarily through on-the-job training, and child labor was highly valuable. Consequently, literacy rates had not increased during the period 1750-1830. The requirements for technical skills in that period, were slight and adequately met by traditional means (Galor, 2005) .
In the second phase of the industrial revolution, industrialization caused an increase in the demand for human capital by the industrial sector. 41 Capital accumulation subsided, the education of the labor force markedly increased and skills became necessary for production. The investment ratio increased from 6 percent in 1760 to 11.7 percent in the year 1831, but it remained around 11% on average in the period 1856-1913 (Crafts, 1985; Matthews et al., 1982) . 42 In contrast, the second half of the nineteenth century was marked by a great expansion of education in the UK. The average years of schooling of the male labor force of England which did not change signi…cantly until 1830s, tripled by the beginning of the twentieth century (Matthews et al., 1982) and school enrollment at the age of 10 increased from 40% in 1870 to 100% in 1900.
This increase in human capital investment was in part a response to an increase in demand for skilled labor by industrialists. The British government responded to this demand by setting up in 1868 the Parliamentary Select Committee on Scienti…c Education which lead to the 1870 Education Act and the 1902 Balfour Act -the education reform in England that marked the consolidation of a national education system and the creation of a publicly supported secondary school system. A similar pattern occurred in other European countries as well as in the USA and Canada (Galor, 2005) . 4 1 Hence the lack of non-controversial evidence about the increase in the return to skilled labor in the second phase of the industrial revolution should not raise doubts about the validity of the proposed mechanism. The increased demand for human capital has not resulted necessarily in an increase in the return to human capital due to a signi…cant increase in the supply of skilled workers that was generated by institutional changes (e.g., the provision of public education) that lowered the cost of investment in human capital and by the increase in the incentive for investment in education. 4 2 The emergence of human capital as a prime engine of economic growth in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, channeled resources towards investment in human capital as well as investment in physical capital. Consequently, although aggregate investment in human and physical capital had increased, measured saving rates (where national accounts consider investment in education as expenditure) remained constant.
Education was not expanded to a similar degree in India in the 19th Century. As noted by Basu (1974) , during the nineteenth century the state of education in India was characterized by a relatively large university sector, aimed at producing skilled bureaucrats rather than industrialists, alongside widespread illiteracy of the masses. The literacy rate was very low, (e.g., 10% in Bengal in 1917-8) but nevertheless, attempts to expand primary education in the twentieth century were hampered by poor attendance and high drop out rates, which may suggest that the e¤ective rate of return to education was relatively low. The lack of broad based education in India can also be seen using the data of Barro and Lee (2000) . Despite an expansion of education throughout the twentieth century Barro and Lee report that in 1960 72.2 percent of Indians aged 15 and above had "no schooling" compared with 2 percent in the UK.
Industrialization, Population Growth and the Demographic Transition
For the major part of human existence economies appear to have been in a state of Malthusian stagnation.
Diminishing returns to labor along with a positive e¤ect of the standard of living on the growth rate of population provided a self equilibrating role for the size of the population in a stationary economic environment. Changes in the technological environment or in the availability of land led to larger but not richer population. The growth rate of output per capita had been negligible over time and the standard of living had not di¤ered greatly across countries.
The emergence from Malthusian stagnation in Europe as a whole was initially very slow, (Maddison, 2001 ). During this slow transition, the Malthusian mechanism linking higher income to higher population growth continued to function, but the reduction in resources per capita caused by higher population was counteracted by technological progress, which allowed per capita income to keep rising. The average growth of output per capita over the period 1820-1870 rose to an annual rate of 1.0 percent along with an impressive increase in education. During this time interval, fertility rates increased in most of Western Europe until the second half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the acceleration in technological progress increased the return to human capital and ultimately triggered a demographic transition in which fertility rates declined rapidly, paving the way to an era of sustained economic growth . The level of resources invested in each child increased and population growth fell, bringing about a sustained average annual increase in income per capita of about two percent over the period 1929 -1990 (Galor, 2005 .
The evolution of population in the UK and India was characterized by these three distinct phases as well. In the Malthusian phase population increased but income per capita remained roughly constant, in the early take-o¤ the growth of income per capita and population increased, and in the modern stage a demographic transition took place and the rate of population growth falls while income per capita rises. In the UK, population growth increased rapidly during the industrial revolution before declining sharply in the twentieth century. In contrast India has not until recently experienced a rapid increase in industrialization and has seen population growth increase with income in a Malthusian manner. This delay in the demographic transition in India lead, according to the proposed theory, to the divergence between UK and India.
Concluding Remarks
This research suggests that the transformation in the distribution of income and population across the globe that accompanied the take-o¤ from an epoch of stagnation to sustained economic growth is partly associated with the contrasting e¤ects of international trade on the timing of the demographic transition in industrial and non-industrial countries. In industrial economies international trade has enhanced the specialization in the production of skilled intensive goods and stimulated technological progress. The rise in the demand for skilled labor has induced an investment in the quality of the population, expediting the demographic transition, stimulating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative advantage of these industrial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. In non-industrial economies, in contrast, the specialization in the production of unskilled intensive goods that has been triggered by international trade has reduced the demand for skilled labor, providing limited incentives to invest in population quality.
The demographic transition has been therefore delayed, increasing further the abundance of unskilled labor in these economies and enhancing their comparative disadvantage in the production of skilled intensive goods. International trade has therefore widened the gap between the technological level as well as the skill abundance of industrial and non-industrial economies, enhancing the initial patterns of comparative advantage and generating sustained di¤erences in income per capita across countries.
The asymmetric e¤ect of international trade on the timing of the demographic transition in developed and less-developed economies, and its persistent e¤ect, therefore, on the initial patterns of comparative advantage, may suggest that the rapid transition of the currently developed economies into a state of sustained economic growth is associated with the slow transition of less developed economies into a state of sustained economic growth.
The analysis abstracts from several factors that are relevant for the assessment of the e¤ects of international trade on population growth and the process of development in less developed economies. Cultural and institutional di¤erences between countries in the determination of population growth, in the provision of public education, and in the process of technological change would be re ‡ected in the demographic characteristics and in the patterns of comparative advantage. Moreover, the adverse e¤ect of international trade on industrialization and thus on the timing of the demographic transition could have been mitigated by the positive e¤ect of trade on technological di¤usion across countries. Nevertheless, labor productivity greatly di¤ers across countries and even among industries in which technologies are very similar. Moreover, since the rate of technological di¤usion depends upon the appropriateness of factor endowments in the receiving country, the adverse e¤ect of trade on the factor endowment of less developed economies would slow down the rate of technological di¤usion. 43 In contrast to the existing literature on the dynamics of comparative advantage, the focus on the interaction between population growth and comparative advantage and the persistent e¤ect that this interaction may have on the distribution of population and income in the world economy generates an important new 4 3 The e¤ect of trade on technological di¤usion is discussed by Findlay (1996) . The imperfections in this process are illustrated for instance by Clark (1987) who shows that despite the fact that in 1910 textile machinery was uniform around the world, labor productivity was ten times higher in advanced countries than in the less developed ones. This imperfection may be related to the e¤ect of factor endowments on the adoption of technologies (Basu and Weil, 1998) ; Zeira, 1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001 ).
insight regarding the distribution of the gains from trade. The theory suggests that even if trade between developed and less developed economies equalizes output growth in the trading countries, income per capita of developed and less developed economies will diverge, since in developed economies the growth of total output will be generated primarily by an increase in output per capita, whereas in less developed economies the contribution of population growth to the growth of total output will be more signi…cant.
In accordance with the theory, cross country regression analysis supports the hypothesis that international trade generates opposing e¤ects on fertility rates and education in developed and less developed economies. It demonstrates that international trade has a positive e¤ect on fertility and a negative e¤ect on human capital formation in non-OECD economies, whereas in OECD economies, trade triggers a decline in fertility and an increase in human capital accumulation. Thus, international trade accentuates the initial patterns of comparative advantage and is likely to a¤ect di¤erently the growth trajectory of population, human capital, and income per capita of developed and less developed economies. Condition (i) of the Lemma ensures that when agents are unconstrained and are rearing only unskilled children, the population is rising. Noting the properties of the old agricultural production technology (1), the economy will eventually reach a state where its agents are constrained by the subsistence constraint. t ) ) 1 still holds since the demand for agricultural goods will be at least as high as it would have been without any new technologies, and thus the shadow Malthusian unskilled wage will be below the levelw u . 44 Finally, for t > (t m ) , the demand for agricultural goods will be growing at the rate of growth of A a t ; which is a greater rate than would be occurring under the Malthusian system. Thus again the shadow Malthusian unskilled wage will be below the levelw u and A Appendix C This appendix demonstrates that the qualitative results would not alter if the production technology in the agricultural section remains land-intensive.
If the economy is characterized by 3 production technologies: an old agricultural technology, described in (1) and an old and new industrial technologies described in (3) (4) , one would need to replace Assumption A1-A3 with a stronger set of assumptions so as to assure that the technologically advanced economy would have a comparative advantage in the production of industrial goods.
In the three-technology model, the relative price of the agricultural good in terms of the manufactured good in period t, is The productivity parameters are restricted such that in addition to (A1) and (A2) The productivity of the new industrial technology advances more rapidly than that in the agricultural technology, i.e., A m ( )
This implies that the technologically advanced economy will have a comparative advantage in the industrial sector if K is su¢ ciently large. The advancement in the productivity of the agricultural sector, A a t ;with t is such that, at some point e t where h t = e h the rate of technological progress rises su¢ ciently high so that the subsistence constraint will not bind in the future, i.e., A
((A4')) where h t e h. In order to assure that the pattern of trade is consistent with historical patterns will assume that K is su¢ ciently large for p Lemma A2 Economy A has a comparative advantage in the industrial good if K is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. Noting (9) Thus the inequality will hold for a su¢ ciently large value of K:
The rest of the results are established straightforwardly subject to (A1), (A2), (A3') and (A4').
